The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 7, Issue 3 , March 2020, , Pages 167-172

Abstract
  This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for ...  Read More

Unilateral Decisions to Hire Managers in Markets with Capitalist and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 5, Issue 4 , April 2018, , Pages 190-196

Abstract
  This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires ...  Read More