Document Type : Original Research
Author
Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan
Abstract
This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires a manager. In addition, the paper shows that if only the labor-managed firm hires a manager, then at equilibrium the capitalist firm’s output and the market price are lower than when neither firm hires a manager.
Keywords
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