Document Type : Original Research

Authors

1 Executive Digital Marketing officer Consultancy Farm [ 01/01/2020 – Current ]

2 Lecturer, Faculty of business administration,Coxsbazar international University

3 Department Of Economics, Islamic University, Kushtia, Bangladesh.

Abstract

The determination of this research is to investigate the level to which the regulations governing professional authority have an influence on the efficiency of the banking sector in Bangladesh. In this study, we selected 100 (one hundred) sample from commercial banks from 2017 to 2021 years, respectively. These banks were all active participants and registered in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). To examine the relationship between the independent variables (bank size, board size, board composition, and CEO status) and the dependent variable (CEO status), a random effect of panel least square regression analysis was conducted (return on asset, return on equity and earnings per share).  According to the results from the analysis, the size of a bank has a favorable effect on ROA and ROE, but a negative effect on EPS. Moreover, the success of Bangladeshi banks tends to increase as their size increases. Corporate governance and financial institution performance in Bangladesh are significantly associated.

Keywords

Main Subjects

COPYRIGHTS

©2023 The Author(s). This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, as long as the original authors and source are cited. No permission is required from the authors or the publishers.

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