Allocation of Public Expenditure on Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Importance of Democracy and Quality of Governance

Document Type : Original Research


1 Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Maroua, Maroua, Cameroon

2 Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Yaounde-II, Soa, Yaoundé, Cameroon

3 Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Ngaoundere, Ngaoundéré, Cameroon


The objective of this study is to produce a statistical investigation of the determinants of public expenditure in and for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa with particular emphasis on the effects of democracy and quality of governance. The data for the study cover the period 1996-2018 in 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. In the quantitative analyses, we perform two estimations: country fixed effects and feasible generalized least squares regressions. We find that only civil liberties positively determine the allocation of public expenditures to agriculture. The strength of democratic institutions and government voice and accountability have no real effect on the allocation of public spending to agriculture. Regarding the quality of governance, only political stability positively determines the allocation of public expenditure to agriculture. Our findings have strong policy implication for politician and different government, which shows that it is more desirable to shift public expenditures towards the agricultural sector by institutionalized the governance and improve democratic institutions. Also, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect agricultural growth.


Main Subjects

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