TY - JOUR ID - 115145 TI - Wage-Rise Contract and Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition JO - International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics JA - IJMAE LA - en SN - AU - Ohnishi, Kazuhiro AD - Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan Y1 - 2017 PY - 2017 VL - 4 IS - 9 SP - 898 EP - 908 KW - Mixed market model KW - price competition KW - private firm KW - public firm KW - strategic commitment DO - N2 - This paper investigates a mixed duopoly environment in which a private firm competes on price with a public firm. The following timing of actions is considered. In the first stage, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. If a firm adopts a wage-rise contract, then it chooses an output level and a wage premium rate, and agrees to pay each employee a wage premium uniformly if it actually produces more than the output level. This irreversible behaviour causes changes to the price-competing market environment of the second stage. The paper presents the equilibrium solution of the mixed duopoly model. UR - https://www.ijmae.com/article_115145.html L1 - https://www.ijmae.com/article_115145_55173b765533d3b2ceffbe63fbe89c79.pdf ER -