TY - JOUR ID - 114746 TI - Unilateral Decisions to Hire Managers in Markets with Capitalist and Labor-Managed Firms JO - International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics JA - IJMAE LA - en SN - AU - Ohnishi, Kazuhiro AD - Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan Y1 - 2018 PY - 2018 VL - 5 IS - 4 SP - 190 EP - 196 KW - Capitalist firm KW - labor-managed firm KW - managerial delegation KW - mixed duopoly KW - Cournot model DO - N2 - This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires a manager. In addition, the paper shows that if only the labor-managed firm hires a manager, then at equilibrium the capitalist firm’s output and the market price are lower than when neither firm hires a manager. UR - https://www.ijmae.com/article_114746.html L1 - https://www.ijmae.com/article_114746_99a363510edc936bdc3399549f45c958.pdf ER -