TY - JOUR ID - 115007 TI - The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms JO - International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics JA - IJMAE LA - en SN - AU - Ohnishi, Kazuhiro AD - Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan Y1 - 2020 PY - 2020 VL - 7 IS - 3 SP - 167 EP - 172 KW - Cournot model KW - managerial delegation KW - mixed duopoly KW - labor-managed firm KW - state-owned firm DO - N2 - This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for them. In the third stage, firms compete in Cournot fashion. The paper presents the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. UR - https://www.ijmae.com/article_115007.html L1 - https://www.ijmae.com/article_115007_db253affc8fac586efa3b38212cefb41.pdf ER -