TY - JOUR ID - 114333 TI - Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Wage-Rise Contracts as Strategic Device JO - International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics JA - IJMAE LA - en SN - AU - Ohnishi, Kazuhiro AD - Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan Y1 - 2020 PY - 2020 VL - 7 IS - 7 SP - 391 EP - 399 KW - Endogenous timing KW - private firm KW - public firm KW - wage-rise contract DO - N2 - This paper considers a mixed duopoly market in which a private firm competes against a public firm. Each firm first has to choose the timing for offering a wage-rise contract as a strategic device. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm chooses either stage two or stage three simultaneously and independently. In stage two, the firm choosing stage two offers a wage-rise contract in this stage. In stage three, the firm choosing stage three offers a wage-rise contract in this stage. At the end of the game, each firm chooses its actual output simultaneously and independently. The paper studies the behavior of the public firm and the private firm in the mixed duopoly model. The aim of this paper is to present the equilibrium outcome of the mixed duopoly model. UR - https://www.ijmae.com/article_114333.html L1 - https://www.ijmae.com/article_114333_c2a9e8917150a51dd7b275029dc8263c.pdf ER -