Volume 11 (2024)
Volume 10 (2023)
Volume 9 (2022)
Volume 8 (2021)
Volume 7 (2020)
Volume 6 (2019)
Volume 5 (2018)
Volume 4 (2017)
Volume 3 (2016)
Volume 2 (2015)
Volume 1 (2014)
Economics
Managerial Incentives in Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Model with Complementary Goods

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 8, Issue 5 , May 2021, , Pages 362-367

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5065856

Abstract
  This paper examines a price-setting mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce complementary goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. Each firm has one owner and can hire one manager to make its production decisions. The paper first analyzes the following ...  Read More

The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 7, Issue 3 , March 2020, , Pages 167-172

Abstract
  This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for ...  Read More

Unilateral Decisions to Hire Managers in Markets with Capitalist and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 5, Issue 4 , April 2018, , Pages 190-196

Abstract
  This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires ...  Read More

Lifetime Employment and Mixed Cournot Duopoly with State-Owned and Joint-Stock Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 5, Issue 1 , January 2018, , Pages 1-9

Abstract
  This paper examines a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a joint-stock firm. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm can simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. In the second ...  Read More

Lifetime Employment and a Sequential Choice in a Mixed Duopoly Market with a Joint-Stock Firm

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Volume 3, Issue 5 , May 2016, , Pages 283-295

Abstract
  This paper examines a three-stage game model in which a joint-stock private firm and a state-owned public firm can sequentially offer lifetime employment before competing in quantities. The game runs as follows. First, the joint-stock private firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Second, ...  Read More